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Abstract—Due to their proven efficiency, machine-learning
systems are deployed in a wide range of complex real-life
problems. More specifically, Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs)
emerged as a promising solution to the accuracy, resource-
utilization, and energy-efficiency challenges in machine-learning
systems. While these systems are going mainstream, they have
inherent security and reliability issues. In this paper, we
propose NeuroAttack, a cross-layer attack that threatens the
SNNs integrity by exploiting low-level reliability issues through
a high-level attack. Particularly, we trigger a fault-injection
based sneaky hardware backdoor through a carefully crafted
adversarial input noise. Our results on Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) and SNNs show a serious integrity threat to state-of-the
art machine-learning techniques.
Index Terms—Machine Learning, Spiking Neural Networks,
Reliability, Adversarial Attacks, Fault-Injection Attacks, Deep
Neural Networks, DNN, SNN, Security, Resilience, Cross-Layer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are known to be
resilient to numerical perturbations and architectural
imprecision [12][27][40][44]. This is demonstrated through an
established performance even after aggressive pruning [26],
quantization [30], and other compression techniques [10][14],
which significantly reduce the number of parameters in
the network. However, recent works [11][16][33][34] have
shown that these networks are vulnerable to surgical bit-flips
in specific locations. Moreover, system-level threats called
adversarial attacks [9] have shown effective ability to induce
behavioral anomalies in DNNs. In fact, DNNs are vulnerable
to malicious inputs modified to yield erroneous labels, while
being undetectable to human observers [13][28]. In safety-
critical applications such as transportation systems, adversarial
examples could be a non-negligible threat to public safety.
For this reason, attacks and defenses on adversarial examples
have drawn great attention in the scientific community. On the
other hand, due to the ubiquity of machine-learning, attacks
from the supply chain such as hardware Trojans emerged as a
threat to DNNs security. In [24], the authors use fault-injection
techniques on SRAM or DRAM to alter the single bit value or
few bit values in memory thereby leading to misclassification.
Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) provide a biologically
plausible alternative to DNNs, because the neuron model as
well as the event-based communication model between neurons
resemble to the current understanding of the human brain’s
functioning. Compared to DNNs, SNNs show a different
*These authors contributed equally to this work.
response to the adversarial attacks [29]. Moreover, due to
their asynchronous and spike-based propagation, the SNNs
are naturally more energy-efficient than DNNs when deployed
in the hardware, as shown by neuromorphic chips like Intel
Loihi [7] and IBM TrueNorth [31].
Towards this, the focus of our paper is to show a new
attack vector that threatens the integrity of both the DNNs and
SNNs. We propose a cross-layer attack against neural networks
that transforms a circuit-level vulnerability to a system-level
security flaw. We exploit memory bit-flips in neural networks
synapses’ weights through a hardware Trojan triggered using
a surgical adversarial attack.
To the best of our knowledge, this is first end-to-end attack
against SNNs that exploits circuit-level backdoor through a
high-level input pattern.
In summary, the contributions of our paper are as follows:
• We analyze the resilience of SNNs to errors.
• We propose a methodology for triggering a bit-flip attack
remotely through an adversarial input pattern.
• We introduce NeuroAttack, a hardware Trojan triggered
by an input noise. We design and compare different
versions of the noise pattern that triggers the Trojan.
• We show the practicality of NeuroAttack on DNNs and
SNNs, by converting pre-trained DNNs into the spike
domain.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Spiking Neural Networks
Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) are considered as the
3rd generation neural networks. The previous generations
employed continuous values for the output signals of the
neurons, whereas SNNs use spike trains to encode the
information. Therefore SNNs, for their binary (spiking or no
spiking) operation, lend themselves well to fast and energy-
efficient implementation on hardware devices [15]. Each
incoming signal from an input neuron, which is encoded in the
SNN technology as a spike train, is multiplied by the weight of
the synapses, and all the results are added together to produce
the so-called membrane potential Vm, expressed as:
Vm =
N∑
i=1
wi · si,
where N is the number of input synapses. When the membrane
potential reaches a particular value, called threshold, the output
neuron “spikes”, or “fires”.
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There are different ways in which the continuous values
can be coded as spikes in time domain. The most commonly
used are rate coding and time coding. In the first case, the
information is encoded by the number of spikes per second,
i.e., an higher number of spikes per second refers to an higher
analog value. In this case, the spike rate is determined by the
mean rate of a Poisson process [41]. Moreover, the pixels of the
images are converted to a constant current entering in the input
neurons, so that they will spike at constant rates depending on
the input pixel intensity. The time coding can be implemented
in different ways, for example the latency coding, in which the
analog value is inversely proportional to the spiking delay of
the neuron.
Many different models for the spiking neurons have been
studied. These models must be at the same time (1) biologically
accurate and capable of producing rich patterns, and (2)
computationally simple. The Hodgkin-Huxley biologically-
accurate model [2] is computationally expensive, whereas, on
the other hand the Leaky Integrate and Fire (LIF) model [42]
gives the opportunity, for its simplicity, to process lots of
neurons in real-time but its biological plausibility is very
low compared to the Hodgkin-Huxley’s model. Other models
have been developed to make a compromise between the two
extremes. An example of such a tradeoff is the Izhikevich
model [17]. However, we take advantage of the simple LIF
model (shown in Figure 1) to explain in the details the working
principles of a SNN, as it has been deployed in real-world
neuromorphic processors.
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Fig. 1: Input and output spikes, referred to the membrane potential for a
simple LIF model.
When a spike inputs the neuron, the associated synaptic
weight wi will be integrated on the membrane. When the
membrane potential Vm overcomes a threshold Vt, the neuron
fires and resets its membrane potential to a value VR, which is
considered to be zero in Figure 1. In addition, due to leakage,
the membrane potential decreases continuously at the leak rate
between two input spikes [4]. The sub-threshold dynamics of
LIF spiking neuron can be formulated as follows:
τm
dVm
dt
= −Vm + I(t),
where Vm is the membrane potential and τm is the time
constant for the membrane potential leakage [21]. Local
learning rules for unsupervised learning can be used to train the
network, as can be done also in the recent Loihi neuromorphic
processor [7]. The Spiking Time Dependent Plasticity (STDP)
local learning rule can be applied. The goal of such a
rule is to strengthen the synaptic weight of two neurons
whose spiking activity happens in a highly-correlated causal
dependency order, and to weaken it otherwise [5]. However,
learning through the unsupervised learning rules is found to
be effective just for shallow networks [22]. On the contrary,
the backpropagation mechanism used to train DNNs cannot
be applied as-is, due to the non-differentiabile nature of the
spiking function [21]. To overcome this problem two solutions
are typically employed: (1) take advantage of an approximate
derivative method, or (2) convert offline trained DNNs to
SNNs. The first solution has been extensively studied in many
works [3][21][23][32]. The second solution is exploited in the
following discussions. The neural networks are described as
Keras models, trained as DNN and then converted to SNN by
means of the SNNtoolbox [39], and implemented by means of
spiking neuron’s simulators through rate encoding. A built-in
simulator based on Keras, i.e., INIsim, is used, which features
the simple LIF neuron model. The duration of the simulation
is set to 50 milliseconds, one millisecond for each time step
while the other parameters are left with the default values.
B. Adversarial Attacks
An adversary, using information learnt about the structure of
the classifier, tries to craft the perturbations added to the input
to cause its misclassification, i.e., its incorrect classification.
For explanation purposes, we consider a generic DNN for
image classification. Given an original input image x and a
target classification model C(.), the problem of generating an
adversarial example xadv can be formulated as a constrained
optimization [43]:
xadv = arg min
xadv
D(x, xadv), s.t.
C(x) = l, C(xadv) = ladv, l 6= ladv
Where D is a distance metric used to quantify the similarity
between two images, and the goal of the optimization is to
minimize the added noise, typically to avoid the detection of
the adversarial perturbations. l and ladv are the two labels
of x and xadv , respectively. Here, xadv is considered as an
adversarial example if and only if the label of the two images
are different (C(x) 6= C(xadv)) and the added noise is bounded
(D(x, xadv) <  where  > 0).
C. Fault-Injection
The outputs of a DNN depend on both the input images
and its internal parameters. By inserting errors in the internal
parameters of a network, it is possible to misclassify a given
input image. Since the parameters of the network, when
implemented in hardware, are stored in memory units as SRAM
or DRAM, with the development of precise memory fault-
injection techniques, such as laser beam fault-injection [38]
and row hammer attack [18], it is possible to launch effective
fault-injection attacks on DNNs [24]. Shattering the accuracy
of a DNN in a significant way, with a low amount of faults,
is a challenging task. This is due to the high resilience of
neural networks which will be analyzed in section III. Towards
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this, an efficient fault-injection technique will be used in
Section III-B, and it will be shown that few tens of faults (bit-
flips), associated to network’s internal parameters, are sufficient
to cause a considerable reduction of performances. The results
of this analysis will be used to build up an efficient attack
methodology through the hypothesis of an hardware Trojan
insertion in the supply chain plus a well-crafted input Trojan
trigger pattern, which can threaten the security properties of
both the DNNs and the SNNs. Unlike previous works, our
NeuroAttack is a cross-layer attack that exploits a hardware
backdoor through a carefully crafted adversarial input noise.
III. BIT-FLIP RESILIENCE ANALYSIS OF SNNS
A. Statistical Analysis of Random Bit-Flip
In this section, we analyze the resilience of SNNs to random
bit-flips in its internal parameters. Two different networks,
whose structures are reported in Table I and Table II, have
been chosen.
TABLE I: Structure of the Multilayer Perceptron network.
Layer Output shape
Input 784
Dense 1200
Dense 1200
Dense 10
TABLE II: Structure of the LeNet network [20].
Layer Output shape Output maps Kernel size Strides
Input (28, 28, 1) - - -
Conv2D (28, 28, 32) 32 (5,5) (1,1)
MaxPool2D (14, 14, 32) - - (2,2)
Conv2D (10, 10, 48) 48 (5,5) (1,1)
MaxPool2D (5, 5, 48) - - (2,2)
Dense 256 - - -
Dense 84 - - -
Dense 10 - - -
The first one is the so called Multilayer Perceptron (MLP).
The perceptron is a basic neuron, which receives as input the
signals multiplied by the synaptic weights. These signals are
summed together with a bias θ, and a non-linear function is
applied [8], as expressed by the following formula:
f
(
N∑
i=1
xi · wi + θ
)
.
These neurons are connected in a dense (or fully-connected)
fashion, so that each neuron in layer l receives as inputs the
outputs of each neuron in the previous layer l-1. The amount
of synapses and related weights connecting one layer to the
previous one is given by nl−1 · nl, where nl is the amount of
neurons in a given layer l. For instance, for a simple 4 layer
MLP, like the one in Table I, the number of parameters is
about 2 millions. This huge amount of parameters is related to
an inherent resilience of DNNs to errors or approximations, as
it has been studied in prior works [12][36][37].
With Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), additional
types of layers are introduced, i.e., the convolutional layers
to extract features from the input image and the pooling layers
to reduce the size of the data. The so-called feature maps
(a) Analysis for MLP
(b) Analysis for LeNet
Fig. 2: Accuracy vs bit-flip probability for (a) MLP, and (b) LeNet network.
of the convolutional layers sweep the input image with a
certain stride, and have shown excellent capabilities to extract
features in the images given as inputs. This trait led to reach
an outstanding performance in many image-recognition and
classification tasks. One example of CNN is the LeNet-5,
whose structure is shown in Table II. It achieves excellent
capabilities in classifing images belonging to the MNIST
dataset.
The two networks have been trained for 30 epochs to
reach the top accuracy of 95.54% and 99.05% on the MNIST
dataset for the MLP and the LeNet, respectively. Weights and
biases are then quantized to 8 bits. The first investigation is
a statistical analysis of both networks. The bit-flip probability
is set between 0% and 95% to have 20 different points, and
it represents the probability for which a weight is subjected
to bit-flip. The results are averaged over 5 different iterations.
The results of accuracy against the bit-flip probability for both
the MLP and the LeNet are shown in Figures 2-a and 2-b,
respectively.
These results show that in the MLP, the accuracy is reduced
significantly also for a low bit-flip probability. However, for
networks with huge amount of parameters, a higher number
of parameters undergo bit-flip also for low values of bit-flip
probability. The situation is clear looking at Figure 3-a and
Figure 3-b which depict the average accuracy (red line, right
axis) compared to the average number of bits flipped (blue
line, left axis), for MLP and LeNet respectively. The number
of bits flipped with the same bit-flip probability appear to be
at least one order of magnitude less in the LeNet with respect
to the MLP. This analysis shows the high resilience of a neural
network whose performance is degraded just for a huge amount
of errors in the network parameters. However, these networks,
as demonstrated in the following section, are resilient only for
probabilistic attacks, while showing very different behavior in
case of well-targeted errors that can be applied by an adversary.
B. Bit-Flip with Gradient Search Algorithm
Analysis for the MINIST Dataset: In this section, we
describe a way to reduce the accuracy of a network by applying
errors on the lowest possible amount of bits. The gradients of
the loss function with respect to the parameters of the network
are analyzed in a similar way to what is done during the
3
(b) Accuracy vs. Reliability Analysis for LeNet
(a) Accuracy vs. Reliability Analysis for MLP
Fig. 3: Accuracy and number of bit-flips vs bit-flip probability for (a) MLP
and (b) LeNet network.
learning, while taking an inspiration from the work of [35]. The
computation of gradients returns a list of n-dimensional arrays
of the same shape of the parameters. The highest gradient
in absolute value is taken and the corresponding parameter
is considered as the target parameter. One of the bits of the
target parameter is flipped to have the maximum reduction of
accuracy. The target parameter is then masked, so that it is
not considered at the next iteration. The results show that the
accuracy is highly reduced for very low number of bit-flips for
the MLP (see the blue line in Figure 4) and for the LeNet (see
the red line in Figure 4), considering a global analysis of the
parameters. Note, only 30 bit-flips are sufficient to completely
crush the accuracy of the two considered networks.
Analysis for the CIFAR10 Dataset: Similar experiments
have been performed also for the CIFAR10 dataset [19], which
is composed of 60,000 training and 10,000 test RGB 32x32
images. The CNN used in our experiments, whose structure is
reported in Table III, reaches 79% of accuracy after 50 epochs
of training.
TABLE III: CNN structure providing 79% accuracy on CIFAR10.
Layer Output shape Output maps Kernel size Strides
Input (32, 32, 3) - - -
Conv2D (32, 32, 32) 32 (3,3) (1,1)
Conv2D (30, 30, 32) 32 (3,3) (1,1)
MaxPool2D (15, 15, 32) - - (2,2)
Dropout 0.25 (15, 15, 32) - - -
Conv2D (15, 15, 64) 64 (3,3) (1,1)
Conv2D (13, 13, 64) 64 (3,3) (1,1)
MaxPool2D (6, 6, 64) - - (2,2)
Dropout 0.25 (6, 6, 64) - - -
Dense 512 - - -
Dropout 0.25 512 - - -
Dense 10 - - -
The gradient search algorithm is applied on all the
parameters of the network, and similar results w.r.t. the
previous cases are obtained. However, as shown by the orange
line in Figure 4, the accuracy drop is far more emphatic. In
fact, the accuracy reaches a plateau around 10% for just 4 bit-
flips, which is a more critical result than the one obtained with
the LeNet and the MLP working on the MNIST dataset.
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Fig. 4: Accuracy vs number of bit-flips for MLP@MNIST, LeNet@MNIST
and CNN@CIFAR10.
IV. NEUROATTACK METHODOLOGY
A. Threat Model
The attack phase is supposed to be within the supply chain
where a malicious actor can insert hardware Trojans. In fact,
modern integrated circuit design often involves a number of
design houses, fabrication houses, third-party IP, and electronic
design automation tools that are all supplied by different
vendors. Such a horizontal business model makes the security
extremely difficult to manage during the supply chain [1][6].
Moreover, the attack is in a grey-box setting, i.e., the attacker
has a complete knowledge of the system architecture and
internal parameters but is not aware of the training set and
training hyperparameters.
B. Hardware Trojan Design
The hardware Trojan is designed to perform fault-injection
(i.e., bit-flips) in the network parameters to undermine its
integrity and degrade its accuracy. The malicious behavior is
triggered from the input through a specifically crafted input
noise. The idea is to trigger a fewer number of hardware
Trojans hidden in the circuit during the supply chain. Taking
advantage of the analysis carried on in Section III-B, hardware
stealthy Trojans are inserted at appropriate locations. Each
Trojan consists of a 2-way multiplexer with one input which is
the original bit, whereas the other input is the complemented bit
obtained through an inverter. The multiplexer’s selection signal
is a signal which is at logic value high only when a trigger is
added to the input image. In this way, the network will behave
correctly when an untouched input is supplied, providing high
accuracy for the original dataset. However, when a trigger is
inserted in the input image in form of hidden noise, the fault-
injections will be activated, and therefore the accuracy will be
degraded significantly. The setting is explained in Figure 5,
in which the thick orange arrows represent the synapses with
bit-flip applied, and the grey neuron is the target neuron. To
produce the selection signal of the multiplexers, the output of
a selected neuron is compared against a threshold through a
comparator, chosen according to the results of our experiments.
Note, the goal is for the output of the neuron to exceed the
threshold when the trigger is added to the dataset, and not
when the original dataset is given as an input. The first step
of the work is to select a particular neuron to satisfy the
desired behavior. To transfer the methodology from the DNN
to the SNN domain, a counter that accumulates the number
of spikes is needed at the input of the comparator. Moreover,
the threshold must be transferred from its analog value to the
corresponding value of spike rates. The counter is cleared at
the end of the processing of each input.
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C. Trigger Pattern Design
Since there can be a direct relationship between the analog
output value of a neuron and the corresponding spike rate,
the knowledge obtained through the analysis of the DNN can
be transferred to the SNN implementation. Moreover, a good
correlation between analog output value and spike rate is a
necessary condition when using the SNN toolbox for DNN-to-
SNN conversion. Our goal is to embed the trigger inside one
neuron of the network, which we call the target neuron. In
other words, the goal of our proposed technique is that such a
target neuron is activated by a carefully designed mask in the
input image.
1) Choosing the target layer: The selection of the target
neuron strongly depends on the target layer. In case of a CNN,
the choice of the layer is directly connected to the choice of
the size of the trigger mask. This is due to the fact that neurons
belonging to deeper convolutional layers are related to a larger
area of the input image. For example, by looking at Figure 6,
the gradients of a neuron belonging to the first and second
convolutional layers are reported. The higher the order of the
layer is, the larger the area of the image that will account for
the trigger. At the first convolutional layer, the shape, position
and value of the gradients are quite clear, and corresponds to
the feature map of the neurons. For neural networks which have
only dense layers (e.g., MLPs) the gradients cover the entire
image. In this case, if a smaller trigger is desired, a mask that
does not comprehend all the area covered by the gradients can
be crafted.
2) Choosing the target neuron: The target neuron is chosen
as the one with thehighest value among the sum of absolute
values of weights connected to the neurons of the previous
layer. This is modeled by the following equation:
argmaxt(
N∑
i=1
ABS(Wlayeri,t)).
3) Choosing the triggering mask: A random initial image is
created and the network is inferred with that image, leading to
a value initialOUTPUTk at the output of the target neuron. The
parameter targetOUTPUTk is chosen to be much higher than
initialOUTPUTk . A cost function is then defined as follows:
cost =
∑N
i=1 δ
2
i
N
,
Where δi = targetOUTPUTi− initialOUTPUTi , i is the index
of each neuron in the target layer. Being k the index of the
target neuron, we rewrite the expression as:
cost =
δ21 + δ
2
2 + ...+ δ
2
k + ...+ δ
2
N
N
For each δi it is imposed that targetOUTPUTi =
initialOUTPUTi except for δk, where targetOUTPUTk 6=
initialOUTPUTk . The derivative of the cost function is
computed with respect to the pixels of the random input image,
to understand which part of the input image influences the
target neuron. Based on this, a mask M is created and a random
initial trigger is generated by the dot product between the mask
and the random initial image. The mask can also be chosen
differently, but it must have some overlap with the gradient
matrix, otherwise the loop that has to be described, will not
work.
4) Generating the trigger: The trigger generation algorithm
(see Algorithm 1) is inspired by the work of Liu et al.
on Trojan attacks [25]. In the first rows, some initialization
parameters are set. valmin and valmax are useful to manage
the imperceptibility characteristics of the trigger, but should
always lay in the range (0,1). The loop proceeds until the cost
reaches a particular threshold, or until a maximum number of
iterations. The gradients ∆ are first calculated and then limited
by a mask that can be suited for the gradients (in that case,
line 4 of Algorithm 1 can be skipped), or can be decided in
another way. Compared to algorithm in [25], line 6 is added
to limit the maximum and minimum values for the pixels in
the trigger.
Algorithm 1 Trigger generation loop
1: INIT(valmin, valmax, lr, epc, epochs, th, cost)
2: while cost < th and epc < epochs do
3: ∆ =
∂cost
∂x
4: ∆ = ∆ ·M
5: x = x− lr ·∆
6: x = clip(x, valmin, valmax)
7: epc = epc+ 1
8: return x;
At the end of the loop, a new trigger is generated with pixels’
values optimized to provoke the saturation of the target neuron.
If the parameter targetvaluek is set too high, in general, the
target neuron will not reach that value but a lower value, which
we call finalvaluek . A threshold is chosen, such as that if the
neuron’s output value exceeds it, the output of the comparator
is set to high and the multiplexers are switched. Then, for
each targeted weight, the selected bit is complemented. The
threshold is calculated through the following formula:
threshold = finalvaluek − ξ,
where ξ is a parameter, which can be chosen according to the
parallelism of the network and the method of the attack.
5) Trigger application: The trigger can be applied on the
image in mainly two ways: (1) as a stamp in the image, or
(2) as a noise in the image. In the first case, the values of
the pixel in the trigger area are exactly the optimal ones as
generated by the loop described in the lines 2-7 of Algorithm 1.
However, this solution could be less imperceptible, and in that
case a careful choice of the layer and/or a careful choice of the
trigger mask parameters (position, dimension, maxval) should
be taken into consideration. The second case could be of a more
general interest and it produced good results, due to a better
imperceptibility, as it will be shown in the following Section V.
Moreover, supposing to have some general knowledge about
the pixel intensity distribution on the image dataset targeted
by the network, the choice of the trigger parameters can rely
also on this information.
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Fig. 5: Scheme of the Trojan attack for the MLP network with the counter added present only in SNN implementation.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Experimental Setup
Both the original and the modified dataset are used for
inference, and the amount of times for which both dataset
make the target neuron exceed the threshold is recorded. There
is the possibility that some images from the original dataset
produce the saturation of the neuron, causing an unwanted
activation of the Trojans for an exceedORIGINAL amount
of times. However, for a stealthy attack purpose, a carefully
crafted trigger should lead to a situation in which this value is
kept to almost zero. Therefore, the accuracy is not noticeably
reduced when the input trigger is not present, i.e., the presence
of hardware Trojans is stealthy. We call dimDATASET the
number of images in the dataset, exceedORIGINAL the number
of images from the original dataset for which the threshold
for the target neuron is exceeded, and exceedMODIFIED
the number of images from the modified dataset for which
the threshold for the target neuron is exceeded. Hence, the
attack aims at being both effective and stealthy, and thereby to
simultaneously satisfy the following conditions:
1) exceedORIGINAL << exceedMODIFIED
2) exceedORIGINAL << dimDATASET
3) exceedMODIFIED ' dimDATASET
In the following, the results obtained using the MNIST and
the CIFAR10 datasets are discussed.
1) Results on the MNIST dataset: Targeting the first
convolutional layer of the LeNet-5 with parameters listed in
the first row of Table IV, the trigger shown in Figures 7 (d) is
produced.
Fig. 6: Gradient representation of a random neuron from (left) the first and
(right) the second convolutional layer of the LeNet.
(a)
(d)
(b)
(e)
(c)
(f)
Fig. 7: From top-left to bottom-right: (a) initial input trigger, (b) gradients of
the selected neuron, (c) mask created through gradients, (d) final trigger after
loop, (e) and (f) two images with applied trigger.
In Figure 7 (a), (b) and (c), the random initial image, the
initial gradients and the mask M are shown respectively. The
mask is crafted to follow the shape of the gradients. The
images from both the original and the modified test set (two
examples from this last image set are shown in Figures 7 (e)
and (f)) are inferred and the results, as reported in Table IV:
exceedORIGINAL = 0 and exceedMODIFIED = 10000.
(a)
(d)
(b)
(e)
(c)
(f)
Fig. 8: From top-left to bottom-right: (a) initial input trigger, (b) gradients of
the selected neuron, (c) mask created through gradients, (d) final trigger after
loop, (e) and (f) two images with applied trigger.
Targeting the second convolutional layer, the produced
results are significantly different. In fact, the trigger is far more
perceptible and superimposed with a significant part of the
images, as can be seen in Figure 8. In this case, with the same
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experimental settings as explained earlier, the obtained statistics
about the threshold exceeding are: exceedORIGINAL = 5 and
exceedMODIFIED = 7585, as also reported in Table IV. This
demonstrates that targeting a neuron belonging to the second
convolution layer leads to a relatively worse result. In fact, it
can be pointed out that the gradients are, on average, higher
than the gradients corresponding to a target neuron belonging
to the first convolution layer. We define the correlation between
the target neuron and the masked part of the image S as follows:
S =
∑N
i,j γi,j
M2
,
Where γi,j is the gradient corresponding to the pixel with
indexes i,j in the trigger mask, and M is the size of the side
trigger, in case of a square trigger. It can be seen that in the
first convolution layer S = 2.21 · 10−5, whereas in the second
convolution layer S = 1.4 · 10−6. This clearly shows that, for
a neuron in the 2nd layer, the variation with the input pixel is
much lower. If we call ρ the value
ρ = exceedMODIFIED − exceedORIGINAL,
we can see that it is getting lower when choosing target neurons
belonging to deeper layers.
Taking into consideration the MLP, a square mask is created
and put in the bottom-right corner. Its side is varied between 5
and 17 pixels, with steps of 2 pixels. Since, at the beginning,
the area of the trigger is too small, there are not enough pixels
to optimize the saturation of the target neuron. The difference
between initialvaluek and finalvaluek results in a small value.
Moreover, a huge number of images from the original dataset
make the target neuron exceed the threshold, leading to a small
value of ρ. A larger area of the trigger, on one hand, increases
ρ as can be seen in Figure 9 and, on the other hand, leads to
a less stealthy trigger.
Fig. 9: Plot of ρ with respect to the trigger size.
In the case of the MLP network, an interesting result is
obtained with a lower value of maxval = 0.1. Even though
we are targeting the first layer, the gradients are covering the
complete image (Figure 10 (b)), since it is a fully-connected
layer. Hence, we create a mask suited for the gradient, which
spans across the whole image, as shown in Figure 10 (c). In
this case, the second method described in Section IV-C5 is
used to apply the trigger. Due to the low value of valmax, the
trigger results to be imperceptible, as shown in Figures 10 (e)
and (f). We obtained a very high ρ, shown in Table IV, and
high imperceptibility, at the expense of a harder applicability.
(a)
(d)
(b)
(e)
(c)
(f)
Fig. 10: From top-left to bottom-right (a) initial input trigger, (b) gradients
of the selected neuron, (c) mask created through gradients, (d) final trigger
after loop, (e) and (f) two images with applied trigger.
2) Results on the CIFAR10 dataset: In this case, targeting
the first layer, with parameters set as shown in Table IV, the
trigger shown in Figure 11 (d) is produced. The superposition
of the trigger on the original images (two examples) is shown
in Figures 11 (f) and (h)).
(a) (d)(b)
(e)
(c)
(f) (g) (h)
Fig. 11: From top-left to bottom-right: (a) initial input trigger, (b) gradients
of the selected neuron, (c) mask created through gradients, (d) final trigger
after loop, (e) first image from the dataset (f) first image with trigger applied
(g) second image from the dataset (h) second image with trigger applied.
B. Hardware Overhead
Given the amount M of bit-flips applied, the hardware
overhead is constituted as the following.
1) M inverters, constituted by 2 transistors each.
2) M 2-way multiplexer, constituted by 16 transistors each
in a 4 NANDs implementation.
3) In the case of a DNN, a digital comparator, whose
complexity depends on the parallelism of the neuron’s
output result, which is connected to the target neuron’s
output.
4) In the case of an SNN, a counter, to count the spikes,
plus a compartor which is set when the counter reaches a
particular value.
The overhead of multiplexers and inverters can be estimated as
(2+16)×M . From the experiments reported in Section III-B,
it is clear that an amount of about just 30 bit-flips is enough
to completely crash the performances of the DNN for the two
networks operating on MNIST dataset, or 4 bit-flips in the case
of the CNN operating on the CIFAR10 dataset. The hardware
overhead of inverters and multiplexers, calculated in terms of
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TABLE IV: Structure of the networks, parameters and results for our experiments.
Net Layer valmax ξ targetOUTPUTk initialV ALk finalV ALk exceedORIGINAL exceedMODIFIED
MNIST LeNet 1st Conv2D 0.3 0.1 100 0.04 0.21 0 10000
MNIST LeNet 2nd Conv2D 0.3 0.1 100 0.08 1.56 5 7585
MNIST MLP 1st Dense 0.1 0.1 100 0.05 1.21 15 9904
CIFAR10 CNN 1st Conv2D 0.3 0.1 100 0.02 0.23 4 10000
transistors, is about (2 + 16) × 30 = 540 in the first case,
whereas it is just (2 + 16)× 4 = 72 in the second case. In the
case of a SNN, a counter is added, whose module should be at
least as much as the maximum spiking rate a neuron can have.
The amount of transistors needed for a module N counter are
given by #transistors = (N −2)×6+(N ×4)×4, where the
first addend gives the contribution of the AND gates, whereas
the second gives the contribution of the T-type flip-flops.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose NeuroAttack, a cross-layer
attack against DNNs and SNNs, that exploits a circuit-
level vulnerability to threaten security. In particular, we
demonstrated that NeuroAttack can drastically degrade the
accuracy of a DNN or an SNN by applying a few number of
bit-flips on its parameters, through a hardware Trojan triggered
externally by an adversarial input noise. The security issue is
made more severe by the stealthiness of the attack, since it
is only effective when triggered by the external adversarial
noise, and practically imperceptible elsewhere. Due to the
linear relationship between DNN activations and SNN spike
rates, the obtained results are transferred to SNN models to
corroborate the fact that the demonstrated attack presents a
clear threat to both SNNs and DNNs.
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